

Message Text

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S E C R E T USNATO 4831

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-82

TAGS: MCAP, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

REFS: A. USNATO 4807

B. STATE 187347

C. STATE 192028

D. USNATO 4636

E. USNATO 4527

SUMMARY: DURING INFORMAL MEETING SEPT 6 GERMAN REPS STATED, ON AN INSTRUCTED BASIS, THAT EQUAL EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON CONVENTIONAL, TACTICAL NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES AND THAT ALLIANCE NATIONS MUST TAKE GREAT CARE NOT TO MAKE IT SEEM THAT THEY ARE UNWILLING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHEN NECESSARY TO PREVENT A MAJOR CONVENTIONAL BREAKTHROUGH. FRG REPS AGREED THAT RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND FLEXIBILITY REQUIRE MAJOR EMPHAISIS IN THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. THEY STRONGLY URGED
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THAT NATO NOT, RPT NOT, CONSIDER PLANNING FOR FRENCH FORCES AT THIS TIME BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL DANGER OF CAUSING THE FRENCH TO PULL BACK FROM COOPERATION IN NATO. FRG REPS INDICATED THAT THE PRESENT NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES FORCE PROPOSALS ARE OF

GREAT IMPORTANCE TO FRG AUTHORITIES IN WORKING WITH THE FRG LEGISLATURE. FORCE PROPOSALS MIGHT WELL INCLUDE NEW ELEMENTS BUT SHOULD RETAIN THEIR PRESENT CONTENT AS WELL. END SUMMARY.

1. US ACTING DEFENSE ADVISOR (DEFAD) (B/G BOWMAN) MET SEPT 6 WITH FRG DEFAD (B/G SCHUNEMANN, FRG ARMY) AND HIS DEPUTY (CAPTAIN ARENDT, FRG NAVY) FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. CAPTAIN ARENDT HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MEETINGS IN BONN ON THE SAME SUBJECT AND INDICATED THAT HIS COMMENTS WERE BASED ON THE INSTRUCTIONS OF HIS MOD.

2. STRATEGY. ARENDT STATED THAT THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN IN BONN OVER THE CHANGING STRATEGIC BALANCE. HIS AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT IF THE PRESENT TREND CONTINUES EUROPEAN PUBLICS WILL SOON BEGIN TO QUESTION WHETHER THE US STRATEGIC FORCES AND NATO TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES CAN STILL BE COUNTED ON. IN THAT CASE, EVEN WITH STRONG NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES THE SOVIETS MIGHT ATTEMPT A CONVENTIONAL PENETRATION AND BREAKTHROUGH TO FRG CITIES. THIS THREAT COULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF MANY EUROPEAN POLITICIANS WHO SAY "THE FIRST THING TO DO IN CASE OF CONFLICT IS TO PICK UP THE PHONE AND SURRENDER". THEREFORE, FRG AUTHORITIES HAVE CONCLUDED THAT MC 14/3 STRATEGY SHOULD BE STRICTLY ADHERED TO WITH EQUAL EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING A BALANCE IN CONVENTIONAL TACTICAL, NUCLEAR, AND STRATEGIC AREAS. CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY SHOULD BE BETTER INTEGRATED AND SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF STOPPING AN ATTACK AND STABILIZING THE FRONT, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST BE READY FOR IMMEDIATE USE IF A MAJOR SOVIET BREAKTHROUGH OCCURS. THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WOULD THUS REINFORCE THE CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE BECAUSE THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AFRAID TO CONCENTRATE THEIR FORCES ADEQUATELY TO SUCCEED IN A CONVENTIONAL BREAKTHROUGH. THEREFORE NATO NATIONS MUST BE VERY CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE NO LONGER WILLING TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF NECESSARY.

3. RATIONALIZATION/SPECIALIZATION OF FORCES. FRG REPS INDICATED THAT RATIONALIZATION SHOULD BE PART OF MINISTERIAL
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GUIDANCE. NATO NATIONS SHOULD STRIVE FOR SMALL STEPS RATHER THAN MAJOR EXCHANGE OF MILITARY ROLES. FRG AUTHORITIES ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE ORIGINAL SPECIALIZATION ATTEMPT IN WHICH THE FRG WAS TO PICK UP THE DUTCH LANCE RESPONSIBILITY WHILE THE NETHERLANDS ADDED EQUIVALENT IMPROVEMENT IN SOME OTHER AREA. THE FRG AGREED TO DO THEIR PART BUT THE NETHERLANDS, WHILE HAVING DROPPED THE LANCE, HAVE NOT RESPONDED WITH ANY BALANCING IMPROVEMENT IN ANOTHER AREA. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE SHOULD ENDORSE RATIONALIZATION AND REQUEST NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RATIONALIZATION AS PART OF THEIR FORCE PROPOSAL SUBMISSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP (EWG) AD-70 SHOULD CONTINUE TO WORK ON A RATIONALIZATION MATRIX, TAKING

A HARD LOOK AT WORK GOING ON IN SUCH GROUPS AS THE NATO EURO TRAINING GROUP, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY GROUPS, CIVIL DEFENSE PLANNING GROUPS, LOGISTICS WORKING GROUPS, AND VARIOUS ARMAMENTS WORKING GROUPS. THE EWG SHOULD REVIEW THE MAJOR PROJECTS OF ALL OF THESE WORKING SPECIALIST GROUPS WHICH MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO RATIONALIZATION. THE EWG SHOULD THEN BE ABLE TO BRING TO BEAR THE POLITICAL LEVERAGE WHICH IS NOW MISSING. THE EWG COULD TAKE PARTICULAR ISSUES TO THE DPC AND, IF NECESSARY, TO THE MINISTERS IN ORDER TO CONVINCE THE NATIONS THAT BY GOING ALONG WITH A RATIONALIZATION PROJECT IN SPITE OF A CONTRARY NATIONAL PREFERENCE IN ONE AREA OR ANOTHER, THEY WILL GAIN SIMILAR CONCESSIONS FROM OTHER NATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THE EWG SHOULD KEEP THE RATIONALIZATION MATRIX BEFORE

THE EYES OF NATIONAL POLICY MAKERS SO THAT THEY CAN SEE THE OVERALL GAIN TO BOTH THE ALLIANCE AND THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS.

4. STANDARDIZATION. FRG REPS PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON STANDARDIZATION. FRG REPS PLACED GREAT EMPHASIS ON STANDARDIZATION. THEY ARGUED THAT NATO NATIONS MUST SACRIFICE NATIONAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND MILITARY PREFERENCES IN ORDER TO STANDARDIZE AT LEAST SUCH ITEMS AS AMMUNITIONS AND CERTAIN CRITICAL SPARE PARTS; OTHERWISE, THERE CAN BE NO FLEXIBLE REINFORCEMENT BETWEEN NATO UNITS. THEREFORE, NATO NATIONS MUST STANDARDIZE SMALL ARMS AND TANK AMMUNITION, AND POSSIBLE ANTI-TANK AMMUNITION. MUCH GREATER STANDARDIZATION WILL HELP TO CUT COSTS FOR MOST ALLIANCE MEMBERS BUT COMBAT CONSUMABLES SHOULD RECEIVE THE GREATEST EMPHASIS.

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5. FLEXIBILITY. GERMAN REPS AGREED THAT A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE SHOULD BE INSTRUCTIONS TO NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO SUBMIT PLANS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GREATER FLEXIBILITY IN USE OF ALLIED FORCES. HOWEVER, THEY AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT SUCCESS IN THIS AREA WILL BE DEPENDENT ON STANDARDIZATION OF CONSUMABLE ITEMS SUCH AS AMMUNITION.

6. PLANNING FOR FRENCH FORCES. GERMAN REPS EXPRESSED THE SAME RESERVATIONS AGAINST NATO PLANNING FOR FRENCH FORCES THAT BELGIANS HAD CITED IN AN EARLIER MEETING WITH US REP (REF A). CAPTAIN ARENDT STATED THAT BONN WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT FORMAL EFFORT IN NATO TO CONSIDER FRENCH FORCES COULD CAUSE THE FRENCH TO PULL BACK FROM COOPERATION WITH ALLIES. FRG AUTHORITIES BELIEVED THAT THE FRENCH WILL GRADUALLY MOVE TOWARD GREATER COOPERATION OVER THE NEXT 4 OR 5 YEAR PERIOD, PROVIDING OTHER NATO COUNTRIES DO NOT EMBARRASS THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT BY PRESSING TOO HARD. NATO NATIONS SHOULD DISCUSS THE ROLE OF FRENCH FORCES BILATERALLY AND NATO COMMANDERS SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED INFORMALLY TO TAKE FRENCH FORCES INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR PLANNING BUT SUBJECT SHOULD NOT BE RAISED IN NATO HQS.

7. NATO PLANNING PROCEDURES. FRG REPS FELT THAT NATO

NATIONS COULD MOVE TOWARD ALL OF THE MAJOR GOALS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES WITHOUT CHANGING THE NATO PLANNING PROCESS. THEY STATED THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO INTRODUCE THE PROPER SUBSTANCE INTO THE PLANNING PROCEDURES RATHER THAN EXPENDING A GREAT DEAL OF EFFORT IN ALTERING PROCEDURES AND ORGANIZATIONS. THEY EMPHASIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE CURRENT MAJOR NATO COMMANDER'S (MNC'S) FORCE PROPOSALS AND THE RESULTING FORCE GOALS. THEY ECHOED ALL OF THE POINTS MADE BY BELGIAN REPS IN AN EARLIER MEETING (REF A). THEY STATED THAT MNCS FORCE PROPOSALS INSURE INTEGRATED PLANNING FOR AN ENTIRE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA IN SPITE OF NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WORKS WITH THE MNCS IN DEVELOPING FORCE GOALS AND VIEWS THE RESULT AS CRITICAL GUIDANCE. FRG AUTHORITIES WILL APPROVE MAJOR ITEMS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET ONLY IF THEY HAVE THE NATO SEAL OF APPROVAL. MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. IT CANNOT GO INTO DETAILS ON THE NUMBERS OF PARTICULAR TYPES OF WEAPONS AND FORCES THAT ARE NEEDED IN A GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. ONLY THE MNC WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
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AREA CAN INTERPRET THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE AND MAKE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS. RUMSFELD

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